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THE NATURE OF CONVERSION
William L. Prossert
Conversion is the forgotten tort. Few courts or law professors1 have
had any interest in it, and with few exceptions' what little has been
written about it has been quite perfunctory. There are as a matter of
fact several hundred cases of conversion reported every year; but, as
in the rather similar case of trespass to land, most of them are concerned
only with the ownership of the disputed property, and the tort itself is
not in issue. There are still relatively few decisions which throw any
light upon the question of just what a conversion is.
Baron Bramwell once frankly conceded that "it seems to me that,
after all, no one can undertake to define what a conversion is."3 There
have been dozens of attempts at definition since; 4 but it still must be
said that there is no good reason to disagree with the learned Baron. All
of the definitions have been either so general and so vague in their
terms as to be meaningless, or so broad as to include conduct which is
clearly not a conversion, or so narrow as to exclude conduct which
clearly is. Nevertheless, the decisions have displayed a rather remark-
able consistency, and in any one type of situation there has been amaz-
ingly little disagreement. It is as if the courts have arrived, more or less
instinctively, at a tacit agreement as to the nature of this tort, which
they have not succeeded in putting into words.
t See Contributors' Section, Masthead p. 223, for biographical data.
1 One reason is that in the law schools conversion has fallen between the two stools
of Property and Torts. The teachers of Property have insisted that conversion is tort
law, and should be taught in Torts; the teachers of Torts have insisted that it is property
law, and that they should not be bothered with it. With the disappearance of the Personal
Property course from the modem law school curriculum, conversion has had perforce to
be covered, for bar examination purposes, in Torts; and in that sadly overcrowded course
it has been received with no enthusiasm at all. No one on either side, with the exception
of the late Professor Edward H. Warren of Harvard, has had any interest in the subject.
2 Of the scanty literature in the legal journals, only the following appear to be worth
mention: Ames, "History of Trover," 11 Harv. L. Rev. 277, 374 (1898); Clark, "The
Test of Conversion," 21 Harv. L. Rev. 408 (1908); Rubin, "Conversion of Choses in
Action," 10 Fordham L. Rev. 415 (1941); Salmond, "Observations on Trover and Con-
version," 21 L.Q. Rev. 43 (1905); Warren, "Qualifying as Plaintiff in an Action for a Con-
version," 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1084 (1936); Note, 21 Cornell L.Q. 112 (1935). See
also Professor Warren's small book, Trover and Conversion (1936).
3 In Burroughes v. Bayne, 5 H. & N. 296, 308, 157 Eng. Rep. 1196, 1200 (Exch. 1860),
continuing: "Some decided cases may enable one to come to a conclusion, but in cases
not similar there will always be a difficulty."
4 A great many of these will be found in 9 Words and Phrases 502-40 (Perm. ed. 1940),
continued in the 1956 Supplement at 145-58. Typical is the following, from Pugh v.
Hassell, 206 Okla. 290, 291, 242 P.2d 701, 702 (1952):
Conversion is the unlawful and wrongful exercise of dominion, ownership or control
over the property of another to the exclusion of the exercise of the same rights by
the owner, either permanently or for an indefinite time.
Compare Salmond, Law of Torts 323 (11th ed. 1953):
A conversion is an act of wilful interference, without lawful justification, with any
chattel in a manner inconsistent with the right of another, whereby that other is
deprived of the use and possession of it.
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The problem is an interesting one, which has occupied the Reporter
and his Advisers working on the Second Restatement of Torts.5 This
article is intended to offer some tentative conclusions reached in the
course of that work.
The hand of history lies heavy upon the tort of conversion. 6 It had
its genesis in the old common law action of trover, whence it still ap-
pears in the indices under the title of Trover and Conversion-a thing
baffling to the law school freshman, and sometimes even to some lawyers.
Trover emerged late in the fifteenth century, as a branch of the action on
the case. We probably do not have the earliest examples of the use of
the writ, but its name, derived from the French word for finding, indi-
cates rather clearly that they were cases in which the finder of lost
goods did not return them, but used them himself, or disposed of them
to someone else. The new writ was invented through the ingenuity of
some long forgotten common law pleader, to fill in the gaps left by the
actions of trespass, which lay for the wrongful taking of a chattel, and
detinue, which lay for its wrongful detention. By 1554 the allegations of
the complaint had become more or less standardized.7 The plaintiff
alleged that he was possessed of certain goods, that he casually lost
them, that the defendant found them, and that the defendant "con-
verted them to his own use." From that phrase in the pleading came
the name of the tort.
Trover, as it developed, had some definite procedural advantages over
the other forms of action, not the least of which was that it avoided
wager of law, a form of licensed perjury which made detinue singularly
unattractive to an honest plaintiff suing a dishonest defendant. Almost
from the beginning, therefore, the effort was made to expand trover into
the field of the wrongful detention of chattels not found. The device
by which this was accomplished was that of treating, first the allegation
of losing the goods,8 and then that of finding them,' as a fiction. The de-
5 Work on the Second Restatement of Torts began in January, 1955, with the writer
serving as Reporter. The Advisers who met to consider this part of the work included
Professors Warren A. Seavey and Robert E. Keeton of Harvard, Fleming James, Jr., of
Yale, Wex S. Malone of Louisiana, Dean W. Page Keeton of Texas, and Mr. Laurence
H. Eldredge of Philadelphia, formerly Professor of Law at Pennsylvania and Temple.
It should be made clear that at the time of writing the proposed section of the Second
Restatement is still in Preliminary Draft form, and is subject to change at meetings of
the Council of the American Law Institute and the Institute itself; and that the opinions
expressed in this article are those of the writer, and not those of the Institute.
6 See, generally, Fifoot, History and Sources of the Common Law 102-25 (1949); Ames,
"History of Trover," 11 Harv. L. Rev. 277, 374 (1898); Salmond, "Observations on
Trover and Conversion," 21 L.Q. Rev. 43 (1905).
7 Lord Mounteagle v. Countess of Worcester, 2 Dyer 121a, 73 Eng. Rep. 265 (1554).
8 Kinaston v. Moore, Cro. Car. 89, 79 Eng. Rep. 678 (Exch. 1626); Gumbleton v.
Grafton, Cro. Eliz. 781, 78 Eng. Rep. 1011 (1600).
9 Isaack v. Clark, 2 Buist. 306, 80 Eng. Rep. 1143 (H.L. 1614); Ratcliff v. Davies,
Cro. Jac. 244, 79 Eng. Rep. 210 (Q.B. 1611).
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fendant was not permitted to deny the losing and finding, so that the
only issues to be litigated were those of the plaintiff's right to possession
and the conversion itself. The fictitious allegations survived, however,
even into our own century, in jurisdictions where the lost art of common
law pleading lingered on; and there are quite modern cases in which it
was alleged that the plaintiff casually lost, and the defendant found,
something like a steamboat or twenty carloads of grain.
With losing and finding no longer essential, trover moved also into
the field of the wrongful taking of chattels, formerly occupied by
trespass.'0 In the course of time it entirely replaced detinue, which
passed into oblivion unwept, unhonored and unsung; and it so far re-
placed trespass to chattels that that action fell almost, but not alto-
gether, into disuse. For some two centuries it was said that "whenever
trespass for taking goods will lie, that is, where they are taken wrong-
fully, trover also will lie."" The two actions, in other words, were re-
garded as alternative remedies for the same wrong.
There was, however, a significant difference between the actions of
trespass and trover, which for these two centuries passed unremarked.
The theory of trespass was that the plaintiff remained the owner of the
chattel, with his possession only interfered with or interrupted, so that
when it was tendered back to him he must accept it. His recovery was
limited to the damages he had sustained through his loss of possession,
or through harm to the chattel, which were usually considerably less
than its value. The theory of trover was that the defendant, by "con-
verting" the chattel to his own use, had appropriated the plaintiff's
rights, for which he was required to make compensation. The plaintiff
was therefore not requited to accept the chattel when it was tendered
back to him; and he recovered as his damages the full value of the
chattel at the time and place of the conversion. When the defendant
satisfied the judgment in trover, the title passed to him, and plaintiff had
nothing more to do with it. The effect was that the defendant was com-
pelled, because of his wrongful appropriation, to buy the chattel at a
forced sale, of which the action of trover was the judicial instrument. 2
10 Bishop v. Viscountess Montague, Cro. Eliz. 824, 78 Eng. Rep. 1051 (K.B. 1653); Cro.
Jac. 50, 79 Eng. Rep. 42 (C.P. 1601).
1 Lord Mansfield, in Cooper v. Chitty, 1 Burr. 20, 31, 97 Eng. Rep. 166, 172 (K.B.
1756); Serjeant Williams, Note to Saunders' Reports, Wilbraham v. Snow, 2 Wins. Saund.
47aa, 85 Eng. Rep. 624 (K.B. 1670).
12 ,, 'The distinction between acts of trespass, acts of misfeasance, and acts of con-
version is often a substantial one. In actions in the nature of trespass or case, for
misfeasance, the plaintiff recovers only the damages which he has suffered by reason
of the wrongful acts of the defendant; but in actions in the nature of trover the
general rule of damages is the value of the property at the time of the conversion,
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The modern law of conversion began when this basic difference be-
tween the theories of trespass and trover was brought into sharp focus
in Fouldes v. Willoughby,"3 in England in 1841. The plaintiff went on
board the defendant's ferry-boat, taking with him two horses. The de-
fendant wrongfully refused to carry the horses, and put them on shore.
The plaintiff remained on the boat and was conveyed across the river,
as a result of which he lost his horses. In an action of trover it was held
that the mere act of removing the horses from the boat, although it was
actionable as a trespass, did not amount to the tort of conversion. Three
judges struggled at length with the distinction, all of them endeavoring
to express the fundamental idea that a conversion must be some act
which denies or defies the plaintiff's right of ownership of his chattel.
Baron Alderson, seizing upon a word used in the argument of counsel,
said that it must be "an act inconsistent with the general right of
dominion which the owner of the chattel has in it.' 14
"Dominion" has haunted the conversion cases ever since. It is, of
course, a difficult word, which has been at best a negative aid. If the
defendant merely takes the plaintiff's horse by the bridle and leads it
a few steps, it is certainly to some extent an exercise of dominion, au-
thority, sovereignty or control over the horse, and it is certainly to some
extent an act inconsistent with the plaintiff's "general right of dominion,"
which must include the right not to have his horse interfered with. Yet
this illustration was given by Lord Abinger in Fouldes v. Willoughby,'-
as an example of a mere trespass, not amounting to a conversion. The
same is certainly no less true of the defendant who intentionally scratches
the panel of the plaintiff's carriage, which was likewise given as an illus-
tration of trespass, but not conversion. 6 On the other hand, if the de-
fendant had thrown the horses into the water, and they had been
diminished, when property has been returned, and received by the owner, by the
value of the property at the time it was returned, so that after the conversion, and
until the delivery to the owner, the property is absolutely at the risk of the person
who converted it, and he is liable to pay for any depreciation in value, whether that
depreciation has been occasioned by his negligence or fault, or by the negligence or
fault of any other person, or by inevitable accident, or the act of God.' Hale, Bail-
ments, 188.
"Another distinction is that a judgment for a breach of contract or injury to prop-
erty, though followed by a payment, does not transfer title to the subject matter in-
volved, while a judgment in trover for conversion will, after payment, effect a com-
plete change in ownership, by operation of law. . . . This upon the theory that the
plaintiff, by suing in trover, elects to compel the defendant to become a purchaser
of the property, and to pay its value at the date of conversion. Freeman, Judgments
(3d ed.) § 237." May v. Georger, 21 Misc. 622, 625-26, 47 N.Y. Supp. 1057, 1060
(Sup. Ct. App. T. 1897).
13 8 M. & W. 540, 151 Eng. Rep. 1153 (Exch. 1841).
14 Id. at 548, 151 Eng. Rep. at 1156.
1 Id. at 546, 151 Eng. Rep. at 1155.
16 Id. at 549, 151 Eng. Rep. at 1157.
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drowned, it was agreed that there would have been a conversion.12 Yet
the act itself is no more than putting them off of the boat, and it is only
its immediate consequences which make it more serious. What seems
to emerge from the case, as the goal toward which the three judges were
groping, is that it is not the fact that the defendant has exercised do-
minion or control over the chattel, or that he has interfered with the
plaintiff's dominion or control over it, which is alone important; and
that it is the degree of such interference which makes a conversion.
In the United States the same essential problem of delimitation arose
in the horse and buggy days, in cases where a bailee made an un-
authorized use of the bailed chattel. In Johnson v. Weedman,'8 in
1843, a bailee with Whom a horse was left to be agisted and fed rode it,
on one occasion, for a distance of fifteen miles. The ride in no way
injured the horse, although it died later from other causes, and could
not be returned. Counsel for the defendant, a young man of thirty-five
named Abraham Lincoln, succeeded in convincing the court that the use
of the horse, although it was a breach of contract and a tort, was not a
conversion, because it was not a sufficiently serious invasion of the plain-
tiff's right. 9 Subsequent decisions, chiefly concerned with the driving of
rented horses for a short distance beyond the agreed destination, worked
out in effect the distinction made in this case, that if the unauthorized use
results in substantial damage to the chattel there is a conversion,2 0 but
that in the absence of such damage there is not,2 ' unless the use itself is
17 Id. at 547, 151 Eng. Rep. at 1156.
18 5 I1. 495 (1843).19 "While we admit that if a bailee for a special purpose, as he is here, viz., agistment
and feeding, use the property for another purpose, without leave of the owner, he is
liable as for a conversion, and, as is laid down in the books, for assuming and exer-
cising ownership over the goods, . . . yet it should be understood only of such an
use as occasions an injury or damage .... If the doctrine of the books is to be literally
understood, that any and every use, by the bailee, not falling strictly within the terms
of the bailment, is a conversion, the mere temporary exercise of the animal for his
own health and improvement, might, in like manner, be charged as a temporary
conversion, subject to be made permanent, and the right of property changed into
the defendant by a judgment. . . . I would by no means be understood as saying
that the defendant had a right, or that it was proper to use the horse, but only that,
that use, in this instance, being without detriment, does not amount to a conversion.
Another form of action would be better adapted to adjust the real rights of the
parties. Peradventure in an action of assumpsit for the use of the horse, the value
of his services might be recovered, or in a special action on the case, on the bailment."
Id. at 497.
20 Spencer v. Pilcher, 8 Leigh 495 (Va. 1837); Mayor and Council of Columbus v.
Howard, 6 Ga. 213 (1849); Towne v. Wiley, 23 Vt. 355 (1851); Woodman v. Hubbard,
25 N.H. 67 (1852); Disbrow v. Tenbroeck, 4 E.D. Smith 397 (N.Y. 1855); Harvey v.
Epes, 12 Gratt. 153 (Va. 1855); Wentworth v. McDuffie, 48 N.H. 402 (1869); Hall v. Cor-
coran, 107 Mass. 251 (1871); Collins v. Bennett, 46 N.Y. 490 (1871); Fisher v. Kyle,
27 Mich. 454 (1873); Perham v. Coney, 117 Mass. 102 (1875); Line v. Mills, 12 Ind.
App. 100, 39 N.E. 870 (1894); Churchill v. White, 58 Neb. 22, 78 N.W. 369 (1899);
Ledhetter v. Thomas, 130 Ala. 299, 30 So. 342 (1901); Palmer v. Mayo, 80 Conn. 353,
68 Atl. 369 (1907); Baxter v. Woodward, 191 Mich. 379, 158 N.W. 137 (1916); Vermont
Acceptance Corp. v. Wiltshire, 103 Vt. 219, 153 At. 199 (1931).
21 Harvey v. Epes, 12 Gratt. 153 (Va. 1855); Wentworth v. McDuffie, 48 N.H. 402
NATURB OF CONVERSION
an important interference with the rights of the plaintiff. Again the char-
acter of the act is the same in either case, and its effect, as a major or a
minor invasion of the plaintiff's interests, is the determining factor.
The subsequent development of the law has been along these lines.
Following Fouldes v. Willoughby there was, as might have been ex-
pected, a revival of the old action for trespass to chattels, and it has
had some occasional use as a remedy for minor interferences, resulting
in some damage,22 but not sufficiently important or sufficiently serious to
amount to the greater tort.23 Conversion has been confined, in effect, to"
those major interferences which are so important, or serious, as to
justify the forced judicial sale of the chattel to the defendant which is
the distinguishing feature of the action. There has been increasing
recognition of the fact that the significance of conversion lies in the
measure of damages, the recovery of the full value of the goods, and that
the tort is therefore properly limited to those wrongs which justify im-
posing it.
Out of all this the laborers in the vineyard of the Restatement have
brought forth the conclusion, be it mountain or mouse, that there is
probably no type of act or conduct on the part of a defendant which is
always, under any and all circumstances, a conversion; and that as to
any particular type of act the existence of this tort is a matter of the
seriousness of the interference with the plaintiff's rights, which in turn
will depend upon the interplay of a number of different factors, each of
which has its own importance, and may, in a proper case, be controlling.
This may be stated in the form of black letter propositions, and tested
by a series of illustrations involving the various types of conduct which
have been held to be sufficient for conversion. Therefore:
(1) Conversion is an intentional exercise of dominion or control over
(1869); Farkas v. Powell, 86 Ga. 802, 13 S.E. 200 (1891); Doolittle v. Shaw, 92 Iowa
348, 60 N.W. 621 (1894); Daugherty v. Reveal, 54 Ind. App. 71, 102 N.E. 381 (1913);
Jeffries v. Pankow, 112 Ore. 439, 229 Pac. 903 (1924); cf. Donovan v. Barkhausen Oil
Co., 200 Wis. 194, 227 N.W. 940 (1929); Win. L. Hughson Co. v. Northwestern Nat'l
Bank, 126 Ore. 43, 268 Pac. 756 (1928).
22 The American cases agree that not even trespass will lie unless there is a dis-
possession, or actual harm to the chattel. Glidden v. Szybiak, 95 N.H. 318, 63 A.2d 233
(1949); De Marentille v. Oliver, 2 N.J.L. 379 (Sup. Ct. 1808); Graves v. Severens, 40
Vt. 636 (1868); Paul v. Slason, 22 Vt. 231 (1850); 1 Street, Foundations of Legal
Liability 16 (1906); Restatement, Torts § 218, Comment f (1934).
23 Bankston v. DuMont, 205 Miss. 272, 38 So. 2d 721 (1949) (opening and searching
purse, removing money); Bruch v. Carter, 32 NJ.L. 554 (Ct. Err. & App. 1867) (moving
chattel); Post v. Munn, 4 N.J.L. 61 (Sup. Ct. 1818) (damaging fishing net); Brittain v.
McKay, 23 N.C. 265 (1840) (cutting crop).
Where the conduct complained of does not amount to a substantial interference
with possession or the right thereto, but consists of intermeddling with or use of
or damage to the personal property, the owner has a cause of action for trespass or
case, and may recover only the actual damages suffered by reason of the impairment of
the property or the loss of its use.
Zaslow v. Kroenert, 29 Cal. 2d 541, 551, 176 P.2d 1, 7 (1946).
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a chattel, which so seriously interferes with the right of another to con-
trol it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full
value of the chattel.
(2) In determining the seriousness of the interference and the justice
of requiring the actor to pay the full value, the following factors are im-
portant:
(a) The extent and duration of the actor's exercise of dominion or
control;
(b) The actor's intent to assert a right in fact inconsistent with
the other's right of control;
(c) The actor's good faith;
. (d) The extent and duration of the resulting interference with the
other's right of control;
-(e) The harm done to the chattel; and
(f) The expense and inconvenience caused to the other.4
In testing these propositions, it is convenient to proceed down the
catalogue of the various types of the defendant's conduct which have
been held sufficient for conversion: taking the chattel, removing it,
transferring it, withholding it, damaging or altering it, and using it. It
is to be assumed throughout that the defendant has acted with the intent
of affecting the chattel, and has not merely been negligent with respect
to it;25 and that in all instances he does not have a privilege to act as he
does. The illustrations will speak for themselves, and the cases may be
relegated to the footnotes.
TAKING THE CHATTEL
1. A, leaving a restaurant, by mistake takes B's hat from the rack,
believing it to be his own. When he reaches the sidewalk he puts on the
hat, discovers his mistake, and immediately returns it to the rack. This
is not a conversion.26
24 Preliminary Draft of § 222A, Second Restatement of Torts, see supra note 5.
25 There is general agreement that conversion is an intentional tort, in the sense that
the defendant's act must be intended to affect the chattel. Negligence, even though it
results in loss of the goods or damage to them, is never a sufficient basis for the tort.
Davis v. Hurt, 114 Ala. 146, 21 So. 468 (1897); Emmert v. United Bank & Trust Co., 14
Cal. App. 2d 1, 57 P.2d 963 (1936); Dearbourn v. Union Nat'l Bank, 58 Me. 273 (1870);
Wamsley v. Atlas S.S. Co., 168 N.Y. 533, 61 N.E. 896 (1901); Heald v. Carey, 11 C.B.
977, 138 Eng. Rep. 762 (C.P. 1852); Restatement, Torts § 224 (1934).
It is not, however, necessary that the conversion be a matter of conscious wrongdoing,
or an intent to affect the plaintiff's rights. An innocent mistake may be enough. See for
example the cases of bona fide purchasers of stolen goods, infra note 31. The de-
fendant's good faith is, however, a factor to be considered in determining the seriousness
of the interference.
26 Blackinton v. Pillsbury, 260 Mass. 123, 156 N.E. 895 (1927). An employee of a club
removed personal property from the locker of one member, believing it to be the locker
of another.
Hushaw v. Dunn, 62 Colo. 109, 160 Pac. 1037 (1916). An officer took money from
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2. The same facts as in Illustration 1, except that A keeps the hat
for three months before discovering his mistake and returning it. This
is a conversion 27
3. The same facts as in Illustration 1, except that as A reaches the
sidewalk and puts on the hat a sudden gust of wind blows it from his
head, and it goes down an open manhole and is lost. This is a con-
version.28
4. Leaving a restaurant, A takes B's hat from the rack, intending
to steal it. As he approaches the door he sees a policeman outside, and
immediately returns the hat to the rack. This is a conversion.
5. A, a sheriff, levies execution on the goods of B, mistakenly be-
lieving them to belong to C. This is a conversion."0
6. A, by fraudulent representations as to his credit, induces B to
deliver an automobile to him. This is a conversion.31
7. A steals B's automobile. In good faith, for value, and without no-
the person of a prisoner before he was locked up, and returned it the next day when he
pleaded guilty.
MacBryde v. Burnett, 44 F. Supp. 833 (D. Mo. 1942). A trustee by mistake trans-
ferred five out of eighty shares of stock belonging to the trust estate into his own name.
There was no other interference with the stock.
Frome v. Dennis, 45 NJ.L. 515 (Sup. Ct. 1883). The defendant innocently borrowed
a plow from a bailee who had no right to lend it, and used it for three days before re-
turning it.
27 No cases in point have been found. It seems clear, however, that if deprivation of
use for a substantial time is sufficient for conversion where the defendant has withheld
the chattel from the plaintiff (infra text at note 63), it is no less so where he has taken it
from him.
28 Blackinton v. Pillsbury, supra note 26. It was said that if the property were lost or
destroyed there would be a conversion.
Donahue-v. Shippee, 15 R.I. 453, 8 Ati. 541 (1887). Defendant cut grass on plaintiff's
land, believing in good faith that he was privileged to do so. The grass was removed
and appropriated by third persons.
See also the cases of loss or damage in the course of a minor unpermitted use by a
bailee, infra note 83.
29 There seems to be no doubt that any taking with knowledge of the plaintiff's rights
and an intent to deprive him of them permanently is a conversion. Lawyers' Mortgage
Inv. Co. v. Paramount Laundries, 287 Mass. 357, 191 N.E. 398 (1934); Hutchinson v.
Merchants' & Mechanics' Bank, 41 Pa. 42 (1861).
30 McPheters v. Page, 83 Me. 234, 22 Ati. 101 (1891); Atlantic Finance Corp. v.
Graham, 311 Mass. 49, 39 N.E.2d 951 (1942); Kloos v. Gatz, 97 Minn. 167, 105 N.W.
639 (1906); Johnson v. Farr, 60 N.H. 426 (1880); Morse v. Hurd, 17 N.H. 246 (1845);
Zion v. De Jonge, 39 Misc. 839, 81 N.Y. Supp. 491 (N.Y. City Ct. 1902).
It may be suggested, however, although no cases have been found, that a levy in good
faith, followed by immediate discovery of the mistake and termination of the levy, is not
a sufficiently serious matter to constitute a conversion.
31 Sale induced.by fraud: Hagar v. Norton, 188 Mass. 47, 73 N.E. 1073 (1905); Hol-
land v. Bishop, 60 Minn. 23, 61 N.W. 681 (1895). Since the theory of the recovery is that
of a wrongful taking, rather than wrongful detention, demand is not essential to the
cause of action. Thurston v. Blanchard, 22 Pick. 18 (Mass. 1839); Baird v. Howard, 51
Ohio St. 57, 36 N.E. 732 (1894); Yeager v. Wallace, 57 Pa. 365 (1868); Restatement,
Torts §§ 221, 222 (1934). Cf. Bolton v. Stewart, 191 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945)
(purchase of goods from lunatic incapable of contract).
Delivery of possession induced by fraud: Roehrich v. Holt Motor Co., 201 Minn. 586,
277 N.W. 274 (1938); McCrillis v. Allen, 57 Vt. 505 (1884). Contra, Christensen v. Pugh,
84 Utah 440, 35 P.2d 100 (1934).
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tice that it is stolen, C buys the car from A and takes possession of it.
This is a conversion. 2
8. The same facts as in Illustration 7, except that C buys the car
but does not take possession of it. This is not a conversion. 3
9. The same facts as in Illustration 7, except that C rents the car
from A, or takes it from him in pledge. This is a conversion.3 4
10. The same facts as in Illustration 7, except that C gratuitously
borrows the car from A and drives it ten miles. This is not a con-
version. 35
11. The same facts as in Illustration 7, except that C is the owner
of a garage, and receives the car from A for storage. This is not a
conversion.
36
32 This is the rule in the great majority of the jurisdictions. The taking itself is
wrongful, and no demand is required before suit. Claybrooke Warehouse & Gin Co. v.
Farmers Coop. Warehouse & Gin Co., 260 Ala. 518, 71 So. 2d 88 (1954); Culp v. Signal
Van & Storage Co., 298 P.2d 162 (Cal. App. 1956); Wilson Cypress Co. v. Logan, 120
Fla. 124, 162 So. 489 (1935); Sims v. James, 62 Ga. 260 (1879); Klam v. Koppel, 63
Idaho 171, 118 P.2d 729 (1941); Fawcett, Isham & Co. v. Osborn, Adams & Co., 32 Ill.
411 (1863); Wyman v. Carrabassett Hardwood Lumber Co., 121 Me. 380, 116 AUt. 729
(1922); Torgerson v. Quinn-Shepherdson Co., 161 Minn. 380, 201 N.W. 615 (1925);
Hyde v. Noble, 13 N.H. 494 (1843); Hovland v. Farmers Union Elevator Co., 67 N.D.
71, 269 N.W. 842 (1936); Creach v. Ralph Nichols Co., 267 S.W.2d 132 (Tenn. App.
1953); Cooper v. Willomatt, 1 C.B. 672, 135 Eng. Rep. 706 (C.P. 1845).
Again it may be suggested that a bona fide purchase, followed by immediate discovery
of the theft and tender of the return of the chattel, is not a sufficiently serious matter to
amount to a conversion. Suppose that A buys a painting at an auction, and when he
gets it into his hands immediately recognizes it as one stolen from B, and gives it back
to B, who is standing next to him?
In four jurisdictions the purchase and taking of possession in good faith are held not
to be in themselves a sufficient interference with the owner's rights to amount to con-
version, so that the purchaser is not a converter until demand is made for the goods.
Parker v. Middlebrook, 24 Conn. 207 (1855); Gillet v. Roberts, 57 N.Y. 29 (1874); Mc-
Junkin v. Hancock, 71 Okla. 257, 176 Pac. 740 (1918); Burckhalter v. Mitchell, 27 S.C.
240, 3 S.E. 225 (1887). Even here, however, demand is held to be unnecessary where it
would obviously be futile, as where the purchaser after knowledge of the plaintiff's rights
claims to be the owner. Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Cotten, 245 N.Y. 102, 156 N.E. 629
(1927).
33 Hall v. Merchants' State Bank, 199 Iowa 483, 202 N.W. 256 (1925); Andrews v.
Shattuck, 32 Barb. 396 (N.Y. 1860). Cf. Jenkins v. Holly, 204 Ala. 519, 86 So. 390
(1920); Matteawan Co. v. Bentley, 13 Barb. 641 (N.Y. 1852); Knowles v. Knowles, 25
R.I. 464, 56 Atl. 775 (1903); Richstein v. Roesch, 71 S.D. 451, 25 N.W.2d 558 (1946);
Irish v. Cloyes, 8 Vt. 30 (1836); Martin v. Sikes, 38 Wash. 2d 274, 229 P.2d 546 (1951).
34 Werner v. Martin, 49 U.S. (11 How.) 209 (1850); Bott v. McCoy & Johnson, 20
Ala. 578 (1852); O'Connell v. Chicago Park District, 376 Ill. 550, 34 N.E.2d 836 (1941);
McCreary & Barlow v. Gaines, 55 Tex. 485 (1881); Thrall v, Lathrop, 30 Vt. 307 (1858).
Cf. International Agricultural Corp. v. Lockhart Power Co., 181 S.C. 501, 188 S.E. 243
(1936) (creditor); Fine Arts Society v. Union Bank, 17 Q.B.D. 705 (1886) (bank credit-
ing post office orders).
A few courts, represented by Varney v. Curtis, 213 Mass. 309, 100 N.E. 650 (1913), have
held that the mere taking in pledge is not sufficient for conversion, and that the pledgee
is not liable until demand is made upon him.
35 Frome v. Dennis, 45 N.J.L. 515 (Sup. Ct. 1883). In Deering v. Austin, 34 Vt. 330
(1861), this was carried to the length of holding that the defendant was not liable where
he kept a cow all winter, and "used" it, apparently for milk. The case looks wrong, and
it is suggested that it would not be followed today.
36 Thomas v. D. C. Andrews & Co., 54 F.2d 250 (2d Cir. 1931); Nelson v. Iverson, 17
Ala. 216 (1850); Shellnut v. Central of Georgia R.R., 131 Ga. 404, 62 S.E. 294 (1908);
Williams v. Roberts, 59 Ga. App. 473, 1 S.E.2d 587 (1939); Gurley v. Armstead, 148
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12. The same facts as in Illustration 7, except that D, who is the
agent or servant of C, in good faith takes delivery of the car for him,
or receives it from him for safekeeping. Although C is a converter, D
is not.7
13. The same facts as in Illustration 7, except that D, who is the
agent or servant of C, in good faith negotiates the transaction by which
C purchases the car, and takes delivery for him. D is a converter.38
14. The same facts as in Illustrations 10, 11 and 12, except that in
each case the car is received with notice that it is stolen. In each case
there is a conversion. 9
REMOVING THE CHATTEL
15. A takes possession of a house, and finds B's furniture in it. He
requests B to remove the furniture, and B does not do so. A then re-
moves the furniture to a storage warehouse, stores it in the name of B,
and notifies B that he may come and get it. This is not a conversion.4
16. The same facts as in Illustration 15, except that A removes
the furniture to a warehouse at a distance, so that B is subjected to
unnecessary inconvenience and expense in recovering his goods. This
is a conversion 1
Mass. 267, 19 N.E. 389 (1889); Strickland v. Barrett, 20 Pick. 415 (Mass. 1838); Nanson
v. Jacob, 93 Mo. 331, 6 S.W. 246 (1887).
37 Cases as to liability for mere receipt are few. In Burditt v. Hunt, 25 Me. 419
(1885), and Silver v. Martin, 59 N.H. 580 (1880), the agent was held not to be a con-
verter. To the contrary are Stephens v. Elwall, 4 M. & S. 259, 105 Eng. Rep. 830 (K.B.
1815) and Miller v. Wilson, 98 Ga. 567, 25 S.E. 578 (1896). See, however, the cases of
delivery by an agent, infra note 57, all of which necessarily involved his receipt.
38 Where the agent himself negotiates the transaction, it is generally agreed that his
interference with the chattel is sufficiently serious to be a conversion, notwithstanding his
good faith. Lee v. Matthews, 10 Ala. 682 (1846); Flannery v. Harley, 117 Ga. 483, 43
S.E. 765 (1903); Kimball v. Billings, 55 Me. 147 (1867); Richtmyer v. Mutual Live-
stock Commission Co., 122 Neb. 317, 240 N.W. 315 (1932); First Natl Bank v. Siman,
65 S.D. 514, 275 N.W. 347 (1937); Nahm v. J. R. Fleming & Co., 116 S.W.2d 1174 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1938).
Even here there are occasional cases to the contrary, such as Abernathy v. Wheeler, 92
Ky. 320, 17 S.W. 858 (1891); Fargason v. Ball, 128 Tenn. 137, 159 S.W. 221 (1913).
3) Warder-Bushnell & Glessner Co. v. Harris, 81 Iowa 153, 46 N.W. 859 (1890); Ed-
wards v. Max Thieme Chevrolet Co., 191 So. 569 (La. App. 1939); Smith v. Colby, 67
Me. 169 (1878); Thorp v. Burling, 11 Johns. 285 (N.Y. 1814); McAnelly v. Chapman,
18 Tex. 198 (1856); Dodson v. Economy Equipment Co., 188 Wash. 340, 62 P.2d 708
(1936); Beckwith v. Independent Transfer & Storage Co., 105 W. Va. 26, 141 S.E. 443
(1928); Powell v. Hoyland, 6 Exch. 67, 155 Eng. Rep. 456 (1851).
40 Zaslow v. Kroenert, 29 Cal. 2d 541, 176 P.2d 1 (1946); Bush v. Lane, 293 P.2d
465 (Cal. App. 1956); Lucas v. Durrance, 25 Ga. App. 264, 103 S.E. 36 (1920);
Lash v. Ames, 171 Mass. 487, 50 N.E. 996 (1898); Shea v. Inhabitants of Milford, 145
Mass. 525, 14 N.E. 769 (1888) ; Geisler v. David Stevenson Brewing Co., 126 App. Div. 715,
111 N.Y. Supp. 56 (1st Dep't 1908); Hammond v. Sullivan, 112 App. Div. 788, 99 N.Y.
Supp. 472 (3d Dep't 1906); 0. J. Gude Co. v. Farley, 25 Misc. 502, 54 N.Y. Supp. 998
(Sup. Ct. App. T., N.Y. County 1898); Lee Tung v. Burkhart, 59 Ore. 194, 116 Pac. 1066
(1911); Browder v. Phinney, 37 Wash. 70, 79 Pac. 598 (1905). Cf. Farnsworth v. Lowery,
134 Mass. 512 (1883) (taking glass plate out of case and carrying off case; not a conversion
of the plate).
41 Forsdick v. Collins, 1 Starkie 173, 171 Eng. Rep. 437 (N.P. 1816). Cf. Electric
Power Co. v. Mayor of New York, 36 App. Div. 383, 55 N.Y. Supp. 460 (2d Dep't 1899).
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17. The same facts as in Illustration 15, except that A does not
notify B, or does not follow the instructions which B gives him as to
where to send the goods. This is a conversion.4"
18. The same facts as in Illustration 15, except that while the furni-
ture is in the warehouse, and before B can remove it, it is destroyed by
fire. This is a conversion.43
19. The same facts as in Illustration 15, except that A moves the
furniture to the warehouse and stores it in his own name with the
intent to keep it for himself. This is a conversion.44
20. A finds B's car parked on the street. Desiring to use the park-
ing space for himself, A moves the car half a block, and tells B where
it is. This is not a conversion.45
21. The same facts as in Illustration 20, except that A moves the
car to a concealed spot behind a building and does not tell B, so that B
does not recover his car for a week. This is a conversion.48
22. A steals goods from B. He delivers them to C, a truck driver,
who in good faith transports them across the city, and redelivers them
to A, or according to A's orders. This is not a conversion by CY47
23. The same facts as in Illustration 22, except that C transports the
goods with knowledge that they are stolen. This is a conversion.48
TRANSFERRING THE CHATTEL
24. A ships goods over B carrier, consigned to himself. By mistake
B delivers the goods to C. B discovers the mistake immediately, and
within twenty-four hours recovers the goods from C, and delivers them
49to A. This is not a conversion.
25. The same facts as in Illustration 24, except that the goods are
42 McGonigle v. Victor H. Belleisle Co., 186 Mass. 310, 71 N.E. 569 (1904); Borg &
Powers Furniture Co. v. Reiling, 213 Minn. 539, 7 N.W.2d 310 (1943).
43 McCurdy v. Wallblom Furniture & Carpet Co., 94 Minn. 326, 102 N.W. 873 (1905).
Cf. Ryan v. Chown, 160 Mich. 204, 125 N.W. 46 (1910); Tobin v. Deal, 60 Wis. 87, 18
N.W. 634 (1884).
44 Hicks Rubber Co. Distributors v. Stacy, 133 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
45 See cases cited supra note 40.
46 See cases cited supra note 41.
47 Shellnut v. Central of Georgia R.R., 131 Ga. 404, 62 S.E. 294 (1908); Williams v.
Roberts, 59 Ga. App. 473, 1 S.E.2d 587 (1939); Gurley v. Armstead, 148 Mass. 267, 19
N.E. 389 (1889); Strickland v. Barrett, 20 Pick. 415 (Mass. 1838); Namson v. Jacob,
193 Mo. 331, 6 S.W. 246 (1887) . "The carrier and the packing agent are generally held
not to have converted because by their acts they merely purport to change the position
of the goods and not the property." Barker v. Furlong, 2 Ch. Div. 172, 182 (1891).
The rule relieving carriers and other bailees of liability for conversion is sometimes said
to be one of commercial convenience, which protects those who engage in such occupa-
tions against the necessity of inquiry as to the title to goods delivered to them, and pro-
tects their patrons against the delay attending such inquiry. It is also frequently said
that the interference itself is not a sufficiently serious denial of the plaintiff's right to
the goods to constitute a conversion.
48 See cases cited supra note 39.
49 Gulf, C. & S.F.R.R. v. Wortham, 154 S.W. 1071 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
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not recovered by B, and remain in the possession of C. This is a
conversion.5"
26. A leaves his car in B's garage over night. C, a thief, steals
a duplicate parking ticket, and presents it to B's employee in the
morning. The employee, reasonably believing C to be the owner of the
car, delivers it to him. This is a conversion."
27. A leaves his furniture in B's house with B's consent. B sells
and delivers the house to C, telling C that the furniture belongs to A, and
C agrees to hold it for A until he calls for it. B neglects to notify A of
the transfer for a month, during which time A makes no demand for the
furniture. This is not a conversion.52
28. A has possession of B's goods, as bailee, agent, servant, finder, or
otherwise. He sells and delivers them to C. This is a conversion. 53
29. The same facts as in Illustration 28, except that A sells the
goods to C, but does not deliver them. This is not a conversion.54
30. A steals B's automobile. He stores it in C's garage. In good
faith, and without notice of the theft, C returns the car to A. This is not
a conversion.55
31. The same facts as in Illustration 30, except that C is A's agent
or servant, to whom A delivers the car for safekeeping. This is not
a conversion."
32. The same facts as in Illustration 31, except that A sells the car
50 Hall v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 14 Allen 439 (Mass. 1867); Marshall & Michel
Grain Co. v. Kansas City & Ft. Scott R.R., 176 Mo. 480, 75 S.W. 632 (1903); Knapp v.
Guyer, 75 N.H. 397, 74 Ad. 873 (1909); Suzuki v. Small, 214 App. Div. 541, 212 N.Y. Supp.
589 (1st Dep't 1925); Hiort v. Bott, L.R. 9 Ex. 86 (1874); Youl v. Harbottle, 1 Peake 49
(N.P. 1791).
51 Sullivan & O'Brien v. Kennedy, 107 Ind. App. 457, 25 N.E.2d 267 (1940); Baer v.
Slater, 261 Mass. 153, 158 N.E. 328 (1927); Potomac Ins. Co. v. Nickson, 64 Utah 395,
231 Pac. 445 (1924). Compare, as to misdelivery by one who receives goods by mistake,
Cowen v. Pressprich, 117 Misc. 663, 192 N.Y. Supp. 242 (Sup. Ct. App. T., N.Y. County
1922), rev'd on other grounds, 202 App. Div. 796, 194 N.Y. Supp. 926 (1st Dep't 1924).
52 Brandenburg v. Northwestern jobbers Credit Bureau, 128 Minn. 411, 151 N.W. 134
(1915).
53 Poggi v. Scott, 167 Cal. 372, 139 Pac. 815 (1914); Miller v. Long, 131 N.E.2d 348
(Ind. App. 1956); Kenney v. Ranney, 96 Mich. 617, 55 N.W. 982 (1893); Royal-Liverpool
Ins. Co. v. McCarthy, 9 S.E.2d 881 (S.C. 1956); Presley v. Cooper, 284 S.W.2d 138 (Tex.
1955); Morrill v. Moulton, 40 Vt. 242 (1867). Cf. Crocker v. Gullifer, 44 Me. 491
(1858) (lease).
54 Traylor v. Horrall, 4 Blackf. 317 (Ind. 1837).
55 Thomas v. D. C. Andrews & Co., 54 F.2d 250 (2d Cir. 1931); Nelson v. Iverson,
17 Ala. 216 (1850); Steele v. Marsicano, 102 Cal. 666, 36 Pac. 920 (1894); Coleman v.
Francis, 102 Conn. 612, 129 Atl. 718 (1925); Shellnut v. Central of Georgia R.R., 131
Ga. 404, 52 S.E. 294 (1908); Gurley v. Armstead, 148 Mass. 267, 19 N.E. 389 (1889);
Leonard v. Tidd, 3 Metc. 6 (Mass. 1841); Nansen v. Jacob, 93 Mo. 331, 6 S.W. 246
(1887); Shellenberg v. Fremont E. & M. Valley R.R., 45 Neb. 487, 63 N.W. 859 (1895);
Manny v. Wilson, 137 App. Div. 140, 122 N.Y. Supp. 16 (1st Dep't 1910), aff'd, 203 N.Y.
535, 96 N.E. 1121 (1910).
56 See cases cited note 55 supra.
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to D, and C delivers it to D in good faith and pursuant to A's orders.
This is not a conversion. 7
33. The same facts as in Illustration 32, except that C negotiates the
sale from A to D, and makes delivery of the car to D. This is a con-
version.58
34. The same facts as in Illustration 32, except that C makes the
delivery to D after he is notified of the theft. This is a conversion.5"
WITHHOLDING THE CHATTEL
35. A takes possession of a house, and finds in it some of B's furni-
ture. In order to keep out intruders, A changes the locks on the doors,
as a result of which B, coming to get his furniture, is prevented from
obtaining it for one day, until he can find A and get the keys. This is
not a conversion.
36. The same facts as in Illustration 35, except that A changes the
locks with the intention of appropriating the furniture and preventing
B from recovering it. This is a conversion.6
37. A stores his car in B's locked garage. A comes to get the car
57 Ashcraft v. Tucker, 73 Colo. 363, 215 Pac. 877 (1923); Hodgson v. St. Paul Plow Co.,
78 Minn. 172, 80 N.W. 956 (1899); Leuthold v. Fairchild, 35 Minn. 99, 27 N.W. 503
(1886); Walker v. First Nat'l Bank, 43 Ore. 102, 72 Pac. 635 (1903); In re Samuel
v. Kerman, [1945J Ch. 408; National Mercantile Bank v. Rymill, 44 L.T. 767 (Ct. App.
1881).
58 Swim v. Wilson, 90 Cal. 126, 27 Pac. 33 (1891); Flannery v. Hanley, 117 Ga. 483,
43 S.E. 765 (1903); Johnson v. Martin, 87 Minn. 370, 92 N.W. 221 (1902); Richtmyer v.
Mutual Live Stock Commission Co., 122 Neb. 317, 240 N.W. 315 (1932); Kelly v. Lang,
62 N.W.2d 770 (N.D. 1953); First Nat'l Bank v. Siman, 65 S.D. 514, 275 N.W. 347
(1937); Nahm v. J. R. Fleming & Co., 116 S.W.2d 1174 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938); Consoli-
dated Co. v. Curtis, 1 Q.B. 495 (1892); Barker v. Furlong, 2 Ch. Div. 172 (1891).
59 Edwards v. Max Thieme Chevrolet Co., 191 So. 569 (La. App. 1939); Thorp v.
Burling, 11 Johns. 285 (N.Y. 1814); Beckwith v. Independent Transfer & Storage Co.,
105 W. Va. 26, 141 S.E. 443 (1928); Dodson v. Economy Equipment Co., 188 Wash.
340, 62 P.2d 708 (1936); Powell v. Hoyland, 6 Exch. 67, 155 Eng. Rep. 456 (1851).
Where a bailee, agent or servant redelivers the chattel to his bailor, principal or master,
more than mere notice of the right of a third person is required to make him a converter.
The common law developed the rather anomalous rule that the bailee was not entitled to
dispute the right to possession of the person from whom he received possession. The prac-
tical justification for the rule has been one of commercial convenience for the protection of
the bailee himself, against the conflicting claims to which he might otherwise be exposed.
The rule is often stated in the form of an "estoppel" to dispute the title of the bailor. See
Hill v. Hayes, 38 Conn. 532 (1871); Succession of Macon, 150 La. 1026, 91 So. 441
(1922); Rembaugh v. Phipps, 75 Mo. 422 (1882); Paccos v. Rosenthal, 137 Wash. 423,
242 Pac. 651 (1926); Restatement, Agency § 417 (1933).
If, however, the true owner makes a claim for the goods, the bailee then redelivers it
to his bailor at his peril, and is liable if it turns out that the bailor is not entitled to the
goods. Hattiesburg Auto Sales Co. v. Mossiron, 136 Miss. 632, 101 So. 690 (1924); Maser
v. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank, 90 Mont. 33, 300 Pac. 307 (1931); Bonner v. McDonald,
162 N.Y. Supp. 324 (Sup. Ct. App. T., N.Y. County 1916); Roberts v. Yarboro, 41 Tex. 449
(1874). The balee's remedy in such case is, of course, interpleader, or deposit in court.
60 Zaslow v. Kroenert, 29 Cal. 2d 451, 176 P.2d 1 (1946); Edinburg v. Allen Squire
Co., 299 Mass. 206, 12 N.E.2d 718 (1938); Poor v. Oakman, 117 Mass. 309 (1870).
61 Thomas v. Westbrook, 206 Ark. 841, 177 S.W.2d 931 (1944); Kirby v. Porter, 144
Md. 261, 125 Atl. 41 (1923); Jones v. Stone, 78 N.H. 504, 102 Atl. 377 (1917); Hender-
son v. Biggs, 207 S.W. 565 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
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and demands it. B intentionally delays half an hour in giving A the
key to the garage. This is not a conversion.62
38. The same facts as in Illustration 37, except that B delays a
month. This is a conversion. 83
39. The same facts as in Illustration 37, except that during the
delay of half an hour a fire breaks out in the garage, and the car is
destroyed before it can be removed. This is a conversion.6"
40. Goods are shipped to A over carrier B. On their arrival, A de-
mands delivery, offering to pay the freight charges stated in the bill
of lading in his possession. A waybill in the hands of B's agent shows
higher freight charges, which A refuses to pay. The agent refuses to
surrender the goods until he can telegraph the point of shipment and
determine the correct charges. This is not a conversion.6 5
41. The same facts as in Illustration 40, except that the agent waits
a month before telegraphing. This is a conversion. 6
42. The same facts as in Illustration 40, except that the agent refuses
to deliver the goods unless he is paid the higher charges. This is a
617conversion.
43. The same facts as in Illustration 40, except that the agent un-
62 Cf. Peck v. Patterson, 125 A.2d 813, 815 (Vt. 1956). The plaintiff bought the de-
fendant's automobile at an execution sale. The defendant removed the keys from the
ignition, and asked plaintiff to step into his house, where he handed the keys to his
daughter, and showed the plaintiff registration papers on the car. The plaintiff promptly
left without demanding the keys. " . . . we cannot hold that the defendant did such
a positive unlawful act as to amount to a conversion of the truck. The defendant's act
was equivocal."
Also Daggett v. Davis, 53 Mich. 35, 18 N.W. 548 (1884) (detention of stock certificate,
without interfering in any way with the exercise of the rights of the stockholder).
63 No cases have been found.
64 Donnell v. Canadian Pacific R.R., 109 Me. 500, 84 At. 1002 (1912).
65 See Beasley v. Baltimore & Potomac R.R., 27 App. D.C. 595 (1906); cf. Boiling v.
Kirby, 90 Ala. 215, 7 So. 914 (1889); Fletcher v. McMillan, 103 Mich. 494, 61 N.W. 791
(1894); Stahl v. Boston & Maine R.R., 71 N.H. 57, 51 At. 176 (1906); Hett v. Boston &
Maine R.R., 69 N.H. 139, 44 At. 910 (1897).
In accord are cases in which the goods are detained for a reasonable time to investi-
gate their ownership, such as Banque de France v. Equitable Trust Co., 33 F.2d 202
(S.D.N.Y. 1929); Stroup v. Bridger, 124 Iowa 401, 100 N.W. 113 (1904); Whiting v.
Whiting, 111 Me. 13, 87 Atl. 381 (1913); Hanson v. Village of Ralston, 145 Neb. 838,
18 N.W.2d 213 (1945); Bradley v. Roe, 282 N.Y. 525, 27 N.E.2d 35 (1940); McEntee v.
New Jersey Steamboat Co., 45 N.Y. 34 (1871); Wolfe v. Lewisburg Trust & Savings De-
posit Co., 305 Pa. 583, 158 Atl. 567 (1931); Buffington v. Clarke, 15 R.I. 437, 8 Atl. 247
(1887).
In most of these cases the decision that there is no conversion is put upon the ground
that the defendant has a privilege to detain the goods. In some of them, however, it is
said that the interference with the plaintiff's rights is not sufficiently serious to amount
to the tort.
66 Beasley v. Baltimore & Potomac R.R., 27 App. D.C. 595 (1906).
67 Long-Lewis Hardware Co. v. Abston, 235 Ala. 599, 180 So. 261 (1938); Semple v.
Morganstern, 97 Conn. 402, 116 At. 906 (1922); Jones v. Tarleton, 9 M. & W. 675, 152
Eng. Rep. 285 (Exch. 1842); cf. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Levy, 85 Colo. 365, 277
Pac. 779 (1929); Boiseau v. Morrisette, 78 A.2d 777 (Mun. App. D.C. 1951); Citizens
Industrial Bank v. Oppenheim, 92 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
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qualifiedly refuses to deliver the goods, without explanation. This is
a conversion. 6
DAMAGING OR ALTERING THE CHATTEL
44. A intentionally shoots B's horse, as a result of which the horse
dies. This is a conversion. 69
45. The same facts as in Illustration 44, except that the horse is
lamed, so that its utility as a horse is destroyed. This is a conversion.7
46. The same facts as in Illustration 44, except that the horse
suffers a slight wound, which incapacitates it for a few days, after which
it fully recovers. This is not a conversion. 71
47. A stores his fur coat with B. Without A's knowledge or con-
sent, B repairs a hole in the lining of the coat. This is not a conversion.72
48. The same facts as in Illustration 47 except that B alters the
coat by cutting down its size so that A can no longer wear it. This is
a conversion.7 3
49. A stores a large number of cakes of ice in his icehouse. B opens
the wall of the icehouse and allows a current of warm air to enter. As a
result part of the ice is melted, and the remainder is fused into a large
mass, which can be separated into cakes again only with great labor
and expense. This is a conversion, not only of the ice melted, but of
all of it.74
50. In the midst of an American city, A slashes the tire of B's auto-
mobile. This is a conversion of the tire, but not of the automobile.7 5
51. The same facts as in Illustration 50, except that the car is at
the time in the midst of the desert of Gobi, where a new tire can not be
obtained without a delay of a month and a journey of four hundred
miles. This is a conversion of both the tire and the automobile.7 6
68 MoLSki v. Bendza, 116 Conn. 710, 164 At. 387 (1933); Hanna v. Phelps, 7 Ind. 21
(1855); Pantz v. Nelson, 234 Mo. App. 1043, 135 S.W.2d 397 (1939); Smith v. Durham,
127 N.C. 417, 37 S.E. 473 (1900); Vilas v. Mason, 25 Wis. 310 (1870); Boardman v.
Sill, 1 Camp. 410 (N.P. 1809).
69 Simmons v. Sikes, 2 Ired. 98 (N.C. 1841); Keyworth v. Hill, 3 B. & Ald. 684, 106 Eng.
Rep. 811 (K.B. 1820).
70 Cf. Dench v. Walker, 14 Mass. 500 (1780) (adulterating rum); Richardson v. Atkin-
son, 1 Strange 576, 93 Eng. Rep. 710 (N.P. 1723) (drawing out part of wine and substi-
tuting water).
71 Cf. G.W.K., Ltd. v. Dunlop Rubber Co., 42 T.L.R. 376 (K.B. 1926); Simmons v.
Lillystone, 8 Ex. 431, 155 Eng. Rep. 1417 (1853); Philpott v. Kelley, 3 Ad. & El. 106, 111
Eng. Rep. 353 (K.B. 1835).
72 Donovan v. Barkhausen Oil Co., 200 Wis. 194, 227 N.W. 940 (1929).
73 Douglas v. Hart, 103 Conn. 685, 131 Ati. 401 (1925); May v. Georger, 21 Misc.
622, 47 N.Y. Supp. 1057 (Sup. Ct. App. T., 1897). Cf. Jackson v. Innes, 231 Mass. 558, 121
N.E. 489 (1919).
74 Aschermann v. Philip Best Brewing Co., 45 Wis. 262 (1878). Cf. Symphony Player
Co. v. Hackstadt, 182 Ky. 546, 206 S.W. 803 (1918); Jackson v. Innes, 231 Mass. 558,
121 N.E. 489 (1919); Peltola v. Western Workman's Pub. Society, 113 Wash. 283, 193
Pac. 691 (1920) (commingling so identification impossible).
75 No cases have been found.
76 No cases have been found.
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USING THE CHATTEL
52. A entrusts ani automobile to B, a dealer, for sale. On one occa-
sion B drives the car, on his own business, for ten miles. This is not
a conversion."
53. The same facts as in Illustration 52, except that B drives the
car 2,000 miles. This is a conversion.78
54. The same facts as in Illustration 52, except that B uses the car
for the illegal transportation of narcotics, as a result of which it is con-
fiscated by the federal government. This is a conversion."
55. The same facts as in Illustration 52, except that B drives the
car with the intent to appropriate it, and to deprive A of its use. This
is a conversion."
56. A rents an automobile to B to drive to X City and return. In
violation of the agreement, B drives to Y City, ten miles beyond X City.
No harm is done to the car. This is not a conversion."1
57. The same facts as in Illustration 56, except that Y City is a
thousand miles beyond X City. This is a conversion.2
58. The same facts as in Illustration 56, except that while the car
is in Y City it is seriously damaged in a collision, with or without negli-
gence on the part of B. This is a conversion.83
77 Jeffries v. Pankow, 112 Ore. 439, 223 Pac. 903. Cf. Johnson v. Weedman, S Ill. 495
(1843) (agister to feed horse rode him fifteen miles); Frome v. Dennis, 45 N.J.L. 515 (Sup.
Ct. 1883) (using plow for three days); McNeill v. Brooks, 9 Tenn. 73 (1882) (horse
rented for riding used to carry goods).
78 Miller v. Uhl, 37 Ohio App. 276, 174 N.E. 591 (1929). Cf. E. J. Caron Enterprises
v. State Operating Co., 87 N.H. 371, 179 At. 665 (1935) (theater fixtures used in wrong
theater); West Jersey R.R. v. Trenton Car Works Co., 32 N.J.L. 517 (Ct. Err. & App.
1866) (car which defendant was under a duty to forward used in its own service).
79 Vermont Acceptance Corp. v. Wiltshire, 103 Vt. 219, 153 Ati. 199 (1931). Cf. Col-
lins v. Bennett, 46 N.Y. 490 (1871) (boarded horse used and foundered).
80 Cheshire R.R. v. Foster, 51 N.H. 490 (1871); Forster v. Juniata Bridge Co., 16 Pa.
393 (1851); Oakley v. Lyster, [1931] 1 K.B. 148.
81 Farkas v. Powell, 86 Ga. 800, 13 S.E. 200 (1891); Daugherty v. Reveal, 54 Ind.
App. 71, 102 N.E. 381 (1915); Doolittle v. Shaw, 92 Iowa 348, 60 N.W. 621 (1894);
Wentworth v. McDuffie, 48 N.H. 402 (1869); Harvey v. Epes, 12 Gratt. 153 (Va. 1855);
Carney v. Rease, 60 W. Va. 676, 55 S.E. 729 (1906). See Clark, "The Test of Conversion,"
21 Harv. L. Rev. 408 (1908), and the excellent Note, 21 Cornell L.Q. 112 (1935), both of
which approach the conclusions of this article.
82 Cf. Fitzgerald v. Burrill, 106 Mass. 446 (1871) (forwarding registered letter by un-
registered mail); Laverty v. Snethen, 68 N.Y. 522 (1877) (surrendering note without
payment); McMorris v. Simpson, 21 Wend. 610 (N.Y. 1839) (sending goods to unauthorized
market); Juzeler v. Buchli, 63 NJ). 657, 249 N.W. 790 (1933) (surrendering check on
compromise of collection); Syeds v. Hay, 4 Term. Rep. 260, 100 Eng. Rep. 1008 (K.B.
1791) (landing goods with wharfinger).
83 Palmer v. Mayo, 80 Conn. 353, 68 At. 369 (1907); Perham v. Coney, 117 Mass. 102
(1875); Hall v. Corcoran, 107 Mass. 251 (1871); Wheelock v. Wheelwright, 5 Mass. 103
(1809); Baxter v. Woodward, 191 Mich. 379, 158 N.W. 137 (1916); Fisher v. Kyle, 27
Mich. 454 (1873); Woodward v. Hubbard, 25 N.H. 67 (1862); Disbrow v. Tenbroeck,
4 E.D. Smith 397 (N.Y. 1855); Towne v. Wiley, 23 Vt. 355 (1851).
Cf. Ledbetter v. Thomas, 130 Ala. 299, 30 So. 342 (1901); Cartlidge v. Sloan, 124 Ala.
596, 26 So. 918 (1899); Stewart v. Davis, 31 Ark. 518 (1876); Mayor of Columbus v.
Howard, 6 Ga. 213 (1848); Wallace v. Seales, 36 Miss. 63 (1858); Fryer v. Cooper, 53
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59. A lends his automobile to B, with permission to drive it. A
then sells the car to C. Neither A nor C notifies B of the sale, and B
continues to drive the car. This is not a conversion. 4
CONCLUSION
The conclusion to be drawn from all this has already been stated,
in black letter form.85 Conversion is distinguished from other interfer-
ences with chattels by the measure of damages-the recovery of the full
value of the goods, and their forced sale to the defendant. In part
quite deliberately, and in part as the result of unexpressed and more
or less instinctive agreement, the courts have limited it to those inter-
ferences which are so important and serious as to justify the drastic
remedy.
The importance and seriousness of the interference which justifies the
remedy is determined in part by the character of the defendant's con-
duct, and in part by the consequences to the plaintiff. As was recog-
nized as long ago as the case which Lincoln won in 1843,86 these con-
sequences relate back to the act and affect it, so that they may trans-
form a mere trespass into a conversion. In this respect conversion is
unique among torts, that its existence may depend upon the degree of
the damages.
There is, however, no one factor which is controlling in all cases,
although any one of them may be sufficient in a particular case. Con-
duct which is sufficiently aggravated to constitute a major defiance and
infringement of the plaintiff's right, such as the deliberate theft of the
hattel, may be sufficient in itself for a conversion, even though the
plaintiff promptly recovers the goods and suffers no actual harm. Con-
duct which is relatively innocent, or trivial, becomes a conversion only
if the consequences are a major interference with the plaintiff's interests.
S.D. 286, 220 N.W. 485 (1928); Spencer v. Pilcher, 8 Leigh 565 (Va. 1837); De Voin v.
Michigan Lumber Co., 64 Wis. 616, 25 N.W. 552 (1885).
In Spooner v. Manchester, 133 Mass. 270 (1882), where the driver unintentionally
deviated from his route, and the horse was injured while he was trying to get back to it,
it was held that there was no conversion.
84 Fifield v. Maine Central R.R., 62 Me. 77 (1873).
85 Supra, text at note 24.
86 Supra, text at note 18.
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